This interview is translated from Dutch. It was originally conducted in and written up by Marciëlle van der Kraan for the newspaper Mare, published on Wednesday, 11 June 2025.
To protect citizens from disinformation, the European Union has now labelled the problem a security threat. Doctoral researcher Sophie Vériter finds this problematic: “Not everything needs to be treated as a security issue.”
“When Crimea was annexed in 2014, I stumbled as a student over the contradictory reports,” says Sophie Vériter. “I researched the situation and noticed that coverage did not match what was really happening. That was my first experience with online disinformation and propaganda.”
That moment was also a wake-up call for the European Union. “After the annexation of Crimea, the EU began working seriously on the fight against disinformation. The first task force was set up within the European External Action Service to tackle Russian propaganda, something that normally happens at the level of member states.”
According to Vériter, that response came late. “We really weren’t prepared at the time, but I must say the EU learned from that mistake.” With the COVID pandemic, the EU tightened its rules on disinformation. “That was a second wake-up call. The task force that monitored and fact-checked disinformation barely impacted the public. Platforms could voluntarily sign codes of conduct, but violations went unpunished.”
A Security Issue?
When voluntarism failed, the EU introduced the Digital Services Act. “This law also places heavy obligations on platforms to take measures to prevent disinformation and online propaganda.”
But after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Vériter believes the EU went too far. “The EU then banned Russian state media like RT and Sputnik. Banning media is truly unprecedented, no matter how bad they are. This restricts freedom of information and press freedom, and in my view that does not fit with what the EU stands for. There is also the question of whether it is even legal to do so. Dutch internet providers challenged this decision at the European Court of Justice.”
Moreover, Vériter finds the measure “completely ineffective.” “People can still visit those sites with a VPN, and what Russian state media publish is still relayed by outlets that are not banned. You cannot stop that flow of information. It’s really like trying to stop the ocean with a band-aid.”
The EU was able to take this step because disinformation was framed as a security threat. “For member states it’s much easier to gain support for policy if they present the problem as a security threat. You see this also with migration: it is not inherently a security issue, but it became one because politicians and policymakers frame it that way. The same is happening now with disinformation.”
“Information chaos is part of our lives, and we must learn to deal with it.”
The situation is different for the Baltic states. “They do see disinformation as a security issue, because they were invaded by the Soviet Union in the past. They carry a historical trauma of how Russian propaganda undermined their independence and freedoms. In addition, a large part of the population is Russian-speaking and has access to Russian media that spread propaganda. For them the threat is real, but for countries like the Netherlands it is not. Yet the EU takes that Baltic fear as its starting point.”
A Gap
But that fear also has a downside, according to Vériter. “If you present a problem as a security threat, you give the impression that it is an emergency. That way you can bypass normal legislative procedures, which comes at the expense of transparency, accountability, and checks. Decisions are made more quickly, behind closed doors, and without public input. Once something is framed as a ‘security threat,’ suddenly everything seems permissible.”
This, Vériter fears, widens the gap between citizens and institutions. “You exclude the public from debate and from democratic decision-making. That’s problematic, because you are deciding what their information universe looks like, without actually involving them in that decision.”
Another risk is that other countries will follow the EU’s example. “What the EU does is often seen internationally as the norm. Israel has already banned certain media under the banner of security. The EU is thus setting a precedent.”
Research shows that fact-checking and debunking disinformation is not effective in the long term, and Vériter is not convinced that banning media helps either. “‘Pre-bunking’ is effective. Preventing people from being manipulated works. People tend to believe information they hear first. It is very hard to change our minds afterwards.”
Dreams
To achieve this, citizens must strengthen critical thinking and media literacy. “Education is therefore very important. In Finland, for example, children already learn in primary school how to recognise fake news online. I think every EU country should do that.
We also need to think about this on a global scale. It makes little sense to try to control something you cannot control. States may pass laws about information, but information does not stop at borders. Europe or the United States can invent as many laws as they want, but you cannot protect citizens against disinformation if China does not also take part in the solution.”
Vériter acknowledges that this sounds utopian. “But I am a dreamer. I believe that everything seems impossible until it happens. Many things that once seemed unthinkable became reality a hundred years later. Information chaos is not something to fear, but simply part of our lives that we must learn to manage. And that starts with global cooperation.”
